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FORMS OF LAW AND MORAL CONTENT
By FOWLER V. HARPER*
I
Regardless of the view taken of the nature of law, the con-
troversy about which, as has been well pointed out, is in large part
due to the failure on the part of jurists to discuss the same thing,'
it remains obvious that law must be manifested in a variety of
forms. By forms of law is not intended the particular type of
law such as statutes, constitutions, decisions, etc., dependents upon
the particular governmental agency responsible for their enunciation.
But by forms of law in the sense here contemplated we under-
stand the character of the legal delaration as regards the extent
to which that declaration is applicable as law. A study of forms
of law in this sense involves a consideration of the particular kind
of intellectual conception employed to express the legal doctrine.
The Continentals, in using the word form in much the same sense,
speak of it as the method of ordering thought.2 In other words,
the term denotes the essential conceptions of thought involved in
expressing law,3 with the pure form designating the uniform method
of ordering. In this character, a consideration of forms of law
involves the problems of the manner in which legal precepts func-
tion and the mode of application of the same by the courts.
We may regard the great body of substantive law as con-
sisting of an accumulation of rules, principles and standards.4 It
is the use made of these forms which constitutes the application
and administration of law, and a study of that application and ad-
ministration is fruitful in an attempt to understand the nature of
these different forms. The simplest conceivable form of law is the
legal rule. The rule is a particular conclusion. It is the least
complicated of legal forms and its operation usually involves little
*[Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota.]
1. See Pound "Theory of Judicial Decision" (1923) 36 Harv. Law Rev.
641, 643.
2. See Stammier "Fundamental Tendencies in Modem Jurisprudence"
(1923) ; 21 Mich. Law Rev. 881, 882-883; cf. "Theory of Justice" 133 (1925).
3. See Del Vecchio "Formal Bases of Law" sec. 81, 82 (1914); ibid.,
editorial preface by Joseph Drake, xxii.
4. See Pound "Theory of Judicial Decision" supra, 645, 646.
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difficulty for the courts, although this does not necessarily follow,
as some striking illustrations will indicate.5
The nature of the legal rule is distinct in that it prescribes
particular operative facts upon which a certain particular legal
conclusion or result shall be predicated. The operative facts we
understand to be such facts or series of facts as produce some
kind of legal consequences.6 The rule, then, sets forth not only
what the legal consequences shall be in a given situation, but it
determines with particularity just what facts shall be operative.
to produce these legal consequences. Thus the criminal law rule
with respect to burglary, for example, sets forth and describes
the operative facts, namely, the breaking and entry of a dwelling,
etc., in the night-time, with the intent to commit a felony. The rule
thereafter prescribes the legal consequences ensuing, namely, guilt
of burglary to be punished with confinement in the penitentiary.
The statute of descent and distribution similarly declares what
operative facts shall produce a particular result, setting forth both
the operative facts and the consequences in law. Rules of this
nature may require interpretation by the courts, but once interpreted
their operation is a simple enough process.
Likewise in actions for tort facts which the law has declared
operative are alleged in the complaint, and the legal consequences
provided by the rule of law involved are invoked in the petitioner's
behalf. All that is necessary, assuming that the defendant does
not allege further operative facts and invoke further legal con-
sequences according to another rule of law, is to furnish proof
of the existence of the facts alleged in plaintiff's petition. It
is thus seen that the principal function of the court, in dealing
with the rule of law, is to consider the relative value and applica-
bility of the various rules invoked by the litigants, and to con-
sider thereafter pure evidentiary facts.
7 The simplicity of the
legal rule, as is suggested by the foregoing, depends upon its par-
ticularity. It operates specifically and exclusively upon certain
particular facts, as provided in the rule itself. These facts once
established, the legal consequences are determined and the func-
tioning of the rule is complete.
5. The rule in Shefly's case seems to be a typical example.
6. For distinction between operative facts and legal consequences, see
Hohfeld "Fundamental Legal Conceptions" (Cook's ed. 19W25) 27-32. Cf.
Salmond's "vestitive facts" in "Jurisprudence" (7th ed.) 357-359. Cf. also
Holland "Jurisprudence" (13th ed.) 158-159.
7. For distinction between operative facts and evidentiary facts, see
Hohfeld supra, 32-35.
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The legal principle, however, is by no means so simple, and it
often gives rise, by its very nature, to considerable difficulty. The
principle is a geiwral conclusion. In passing from the particular
to the general, or in going from the general to the particular, the
intellectual processes are distinctly more complex than in the mere
application of a particular conclusion, and the courts encounter ob-
stacles. That this difficulty is commonly experienced is evidenced
by the constant propensity of judges to reduce principles to rules
with which they feel on more intimate terms. The difficulty is
due to the fact that the principle, being general, prescribes the legal
consequences that shall ensue, not from particular operative facts,
but from a general kind of operative facts, leaving the facts them-
selves to be determined in some other way. The function of the
court is here twofold. When the preliminary question of the
relative value and applicability of various conflicting principles has
been determined for the specific case, the most difficult part of
the court's duties yet remains. Not only must evidentiary facts be
considered to determine whether certain operative facts be present
under the circumstances, but it must determine what operative
facts shall fulfill the general requirements imposed by the legal
principle as requisites for producing the legal consequences pro-
vided therefor.
That liability attaches when a defendant has produced an
injury to another, even though unintentional and without malice,
providing the defendant has been legally negligent, is a principle
long established in the law of torts. Here, however, are provided
certain legal consequences for a general kind of operative facts,
the particular facts themselves, in any given situation being un-
determined as to their legal consequences. Consequently when the
court has to consider a situation involving this principle, two
processes must take place: (1) the evidentiary facts must be
sifted and weighed to determine what ultimate facts are present-
the factum probandumn must be established from the factun probans;
(2) these ultimate facts, factiom probandum, must be considered
to determine whether or not, in the particular instance, they shall
be deemed operative to produce the legal consequences designated
in the legal principle. In other words, the facts in the case, as
proved, must be regarded to determine whether or not they come
within the principle. This second function of the court, in han-
dling legal principles, is, of course, the difficult one. The principle
8. See WViqnore "Evidence" (2nd ed.) sec. 2.
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once given, the succinct observation of Mr. Justice Holmes is
pertinent: "general principles do not decide concrete cases."9
As a typical example of the legal principle might be cited
that broad axiom of governing power which lawyers refer to as
the "police power." By virtue of the police power, the govern-
ment may lawfully impose certain restrictions upon individual ex-
ercise of liberty and may place such restraints upon the enjoyment
of legal rights as may be deemed reasonably necessary to prevent
the abuse of similar rights by the careless and unskillful, to the
detriment of society.1o Here is uniformly recognized a principle,
broad and general in its scope, and one within which continually
varying series of operative facts may, from time to time, be
brought." In truth, no phase of the law has been subjected to
more or to greater expansion than has this principle, or rather
than has its application, and many facts which a few years ago
would not be operative, as falling within the limits of this principle,
are now fully conceded to come within its provisions.'2
This twofold function of the courts, the treatment of evi-
dentiary facts and the determination of operative facts as well,
gives occasion for many conflicting views and for a steady growth
in the law. In the last analysis, the principle asserts certain
fundamental premises, the deductions from which will largely de-
pend upon public policy and the growth and development of the
various interests intended to be protected by the principle in ques-
tion.13  The police power, as a principle intended to protect cer-
9. Dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 76.
10. Freund "Police Power" (1904) sec. 8.
11. See the pertinent quotation by Mr. Justice Eakin in Stcttler v.
O'Hara (1914) 60 Oregon 519.
12. Cf. the decision in Lochner v. New York supra, with the decision in
Bunting v. Oregon (1917) 243 U. S. 426. In the former decision the New
York statute prohibiting bakers from working for more than ten hours in
one day was pronounced unconstitutional. In the Bunting case, a similar
Oregon statute, not restricted in its operation to bakers, was pronounced
valid. The New York decision did not turn upon the equal protection of
law clause, but upon the due process clause. This means that the social
interest in the welfare of bakers was not sufficient to justify the protection
sought to be afforded them under the police power. Approximately the same
interest was great enough to invoke the operation of the principle in the
Oregon case.
13. With legal principles, there should be no confusion of such broad
postulates of legal reasoning as "no wrong without a remedy," "no liability
without fault," and the like. These seem to be mere inductive assumptions
rather than premises from which judicial reasoning should proceed. They
may be regarded as formulae or maxims expressing the general policy of the
law, or assumptions from deductions made from legal principles. It seems
erroneous, however, to consider them as, in themselves, principles of law.
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tain interests, has expanded as the importance of the various in-
terests themselves, from time to time, has warranted.
Since principles are insufficient, in themselves, to determine
concrete cases, it is obvious that something further is necessary to
complete the process of the administration of the law by the courts.
How are the operative facts to be determined? The answer to
this query involves the third fo jm of law, the legal standard. It
it a universal conclusion, as opposed to the general conclusion and
the particular conchuion. The difficulty in going from the particular
to the general is only exceeded by that encountered in passing from
the general to the universal and vice versa. The relationship be-
tween the legal principle and the legal standard is of vast signif-
icance. The standard represents the agency whereby the principle
is determined to be operative. In other words, it is the means
of determining what facts shall become operative facts. The stand-
ard measures the facts in the particular situation, to determine
whether they shall be sufficient to bring the case within the legal con-
sequences provided for in the principle.
The police power and its operation are again an instructive
example. Modem views of the police power of the state restrict
the restraints which may be lawfully imposed upon individual
rights to reasonable restrictions.1 4 The due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been uniformly regarded as so
circumscribing the power.'5 So it is that the legal standard must
measure the extent to which the principle of the police power is
to be applied. When a state legislature enacts a rule of law, it
provides for a definite legal consequence upon the contingency of
certain operative facts existing. The effect of such a measure
may be to deprive individuals of their liberty or of their property.
The statute is constitutional and in accordance with the law of
the land, however, if it can be shown to be within the police power
of the state, or, in other words, if it be within the principle of
the police power. The legal consequences of that principle insure
the validity of the statute. This means that the rule is within
the police power, provided the facts involved are "operative" to
invoke the legal consequences of that principle, which are the con-
stitutionality of the statute in question. For the purpose of de-
termining what facts shall be deemed operative or whether the ul-
14. See Commonwealth v. Agler (1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 85; see
also Stettler v. O'Hara (1914) 60 Oregon 519.
15. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy v. Drainage Commissioners (1906)
200 U. S. 561.
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timate facts in the particular instance 6 shall be deemed operative,
a legal standard is required. The functioning of the legal prin-
ciple, the general conclusion of law, is consequently measured by
the application of the legal standard, the universal conclusion of
law. Thus the rule (statute) in question shall be valid (legal con-
sequences) if it can be brought within the principle (police power) ;
it is within the principle if it conforms to the standard (reason-
ableness) prescribed by "due process of law." We have in this
process of thinking a direct progression from the particular to
the general, and from the general to the universal.
It must be obvious that there is much more likelihood of
error in the application of a legal principle, depending as it does
upon the operation of a standard, than in the application of a
mere rule of law, because of the dual nature of the intellectual
process involved. This may account for the constant tendency
on the part of courts and lawyers, particularly in stagnant periods
of the law, to reduce principles to rules by eliminating the stand-
ard. Accompanying this there follows, of course, the distinct
tendency to substitute reasoning by analogy for deductive and
inductive processes.' The results which proceed from such ten-
dencies are fatal to the adequacy of the law to meet the continually
increasing demands made upon it. Not the least among these in-
jurious effects must be placed the persistence in the use of legal
rules long after the reason for the rule has ceased to exist. Thus
it is that the rule that a defendant may not be relieved from lia-
bility in tort for assault even by agreement to fight exists to this
day in many American jurisdictions notwithstanding the fact that
a wrongdoer is thereby permitted to profit by his own wrongful
acts. 8 The principle, formerly controlling, that no man could
lawfully consent to a violation of the king's peace, was applied in
the earlier law because of the quasi-criminal nature of the action. "
The principle, having been reduced to a rule, continues to govern
although the complete distinction between criminal and civil actions
has entirely removed the former grounds for its applicability.
So, too, is the maxim of equity, Vigilantibus non dornwntibus
aequitas sub venit (Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slum-
ber on their rights) but a mere rule in the statute of limitations,
16. The existence of the statute is here a "fact."
17. See e. g., note 24, post.
18. Stout v. Wren (1821) 1 Hawks (N. C.) 420.
19. See Bohlen "Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the
Peace" (1924) 24 Columb. Law Rev. 819, 826-829.
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and the standard of "due care" in tort actions has become a rule
of lav in statutes requiring the plaintiff actually to "stop, look
and listen" upon approach to a railroad crossing. On the other
hand, however, it must be noticed that a contrary process takes
place at times, and a rule is extended and broadened until it de-
velops into what more nearly represents a principle. This seems
to take place in precisely the opposite manner, namely, the placing
of emphasis upon the reasons for a legal rule rather than upon
the rule itself as a strict admonition of logic. So it was that the
well known rule that title does not pass in the sale of personal
property, if there be anything remaining for the vendor to do to
put the goods in a deliverable condition,20 has given way to the
principle that the intention of the parties must govern, although
under such circumstances the intention of the parties is presumed
to be that title should not pass unless there be evidence to indicate
a contrary intent.21 From a point of view of evidence, a con-
clusion of law has given way to a rebuttable presumption, which,
in the absence only of evidence to the contrary, becomes con-
clusive. What has actually happened is that a rule of law and logic
has given way to the broad principle of intention, depending, as
it does, upon the standard of the reasonable man. This seems
true notwithstanding that definite rules prevail which, for the sake
of certainty, are to be deemed the intention of the parties when
there is nothing to indicate otherwise.22
How judicial decision sometimes operates to reduce a standard
to a rule may be illustrated by the mental process of the court
in the minimum wage decision for the District of Columbia.23  The
act of Congress was challenged as being violative of the due proc-
ess of law clause. It was defended as being within the police
power. Instead of applying the test of reasonableness as a stand-
ard, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, resorted
to a rule of law as established by the historical development of
the police power. The various types of statutes which had been
adjudicated as complying with the requirements of due process of
law and therefore within the police power were considered and
20. Rugg v. Minett (1809) 11 East 210; Hanson v. Meyer (1805) 6 East
614.
21. Turley v. Bates (1863) 2 H. & C. 200. See Williston "Sales" (2nd
ed.) secs. 268, 269.
22. See Uniform Sales Act, sec. 19.
23. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
22 ILLINOIS LAIV REVIEW
classified.2 4  Finding that the minimum wage act did not fall with-
in any one of these categories it was concluded, and thereupon
decided, that the act was beyond the limits of the police power,
and therefore unconstitutional as violative of due process of law.2 5
I~ere, as in the reduction of equitable principles to rules of law,
flexibility and elasticity are sacrificed for the corresponding gain
in stability and certainty.26
It would appear that although there is a continual modifi-
cation of legal principles and standards into legal rules, and, at
the same time, an expansion in the other direction of rules to
principles and standards, still the legal form is distinct, and its
operation in law depends upon its nature as a form of law. Forms
have been divided into pure forms and limited forms, the latter
depending upon some higher form for their validity.21 It would
seem that the standard is .the pure form, in this significance, in-
asmuch as it is a universal conclusion-a method of ordering which
is of "uniform validity." The rule and the principle readily fall
into the category fixed by the Continentals as the limited form, for,
as has been pointed out, the principle, and a fortiori the rule, de-
pend for their validity upon the higher or pure form, the legal
standard. Conclusions which are but particular or, at most, but
general, must necessarily be limited, but it is otherwise as to con-
clusions which are universal. Here we have an ordering of thought,
the method of which, as designated by Stammler and others, is
called the pure or unlimited form, for it is one of universal validity.
These differences in the nature and functioning of distinct
forms suggest numerous problems and perhaps offer explanations
for phenomena which have long been the subject of juristic dis-
cussion and speculation. It may be instructive to consider the
variability which these forms display in the absorption of moral
principles into the law to the end of obtaining some light upon
the much disputed relation of law and morals.
24. Ibid., 545-554. Particularly page 554 where the court concludes:
"If now, in the light furnished by the foregoing exceptions to the general
rule forbidding legislative interference with freedom of contract, we examine
and analyze the statute in question, we shall find that it differs from them in
every material respect."
25. See Nesbit "Due Process of Law and Opinion" (1926) 26 Columb.
Law Rev. 23.
26. Cf. Pound "Law and Morals" (1924) 34, note 57.
27. "Fundamental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence" supra, 883.
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II
Perhaps no notion is more prevalent than that one which is
responsible for the belief that the law is one thing and morals
another, and never the twain shall meet. Originally there must
have been a close relationship between the two. Morality, evolv-
ing, as we are led to believe, from the tribal taboo, could not have
been distinct from kingly fiat or the binding force of custom.
Whether, for example, men in the savage state dared not eat from
the king's dish from fear of disaster, inspired by a code of mingled
morals and superstition, or from the fear of incurring the wrath
of the sovereign may well be open to doubt or speculation. Surely
the taboo was strongly felt in determining violations of both moral
and legal rules. Under scientific systems of law and elaborate codes
of ethics, however, the tendency has been marked to distinguish care-
fully the moral and the legal sanction. Austin, of course, con-
tributed in no small degree to this distinction among English
lawyers, for, as a typical example of an analytical jurist, he con-
ceived law and morals to be distinct in every respect.2  Law, as
a general rule of external human conduct commanded by a sovereign
political authority, was ideally expressed in statutes.29  Statutes
being; in the main, typical rides of law, we should expect to find
the moral element less pronounced in the legal rule than in any
other form of law. There is no place in the system of the ana-
lytical jurist for the enforcement by law of what he conceives to
be purely ethical demands, and as law is "commanded by a sov-
ereign political authority," law and morals diverge and ethical
considerations are left to the science of legislation.30  From the
historical jurist's view, likewise, the distinction between law and
morals is obvious, for law, as a matter of history, is always con-
fined within the limits of what is or has been, rather than what
morally or logically ought to be.3 '
Law, then, whether commanded or whether grown, is something
to which morals can have but incidental and but casual significance.
This, it develops, is more nearly true with respect to legal rules,
which, in the main, were what Austin had in mind as law. There
is nothing to retard the growth and expansion of ethical doctrine
28. See Pound "Theory of Judicial Decision" supra, 659.
29. Pound "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1911)
24 Harv. Law Rev. 591, 595.
30. Pound "Interpretations of Legal History" (1923) 98-99.
31. Clark "Practical Jurisprudence" 16, 17.
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save the experiences of man and the limits of his intellect. Law,
however, as a rule, prescribing definite legal consequences. for
particular operative facts, may or may not coincide with ethical
dogma. It is futile to expect that which must be commanded by
a sovereign political authority or that which slowly evolves from
custom to keep pace with moral thinking. As regards legal rules,
then, law can scarcely be said to be directly related to morals, the
legal sanction being distinct from the moral sanction.
What is true of the rule of law might be expected to be true
of the legal principle, from the analytical and historical jurist's
point of view, were it not for the effect of the legal standard.
The Roman standard of bona fides, the common law standard of the
reasonable man, as well as our Constitutional standard of due proc-
ess of law demand a closer relationship between law and right,
that is, between the legal and the moral. If Continental legal
literature is difficult to read in English because of the double
meaning of such words as recht, droit, dritto, etc., perhaps the
common law has differentiated too much between lex" and jus.
32 It
is significant, however, that in all ages men have defined law
in terms of right-the legal in terms of the moral. Thus Cicero
spoke of law, meaning leX 3 as "nothing more than right reason,
commanding what is right, prohibiting the contrary. '34  Cicero
knew the le" of the comitia, and yet he knew what the equitable
standards of the praetor had accomplished. Hence the two ideas
are blended and lex is described in terms of jus.3 5 St. Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century writes of lex naturalis, as the
same thing as Cicero's "right reason," coming from God, but im-
mediately from human wisdom and reason. 3 Five hundred years
later Blackstone advanced in substance the same theory:
4. . .This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dedi-
cated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other.
It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no
human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them
as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from the original.
"But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each indi-
vidual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason, whose office is




35. Pound "Theories of Law" supra, 119-120.
36. Ibid., 123.
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to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs in
every circumstance of life . . .,,37
Grotius, in the seventeenth century, openly espoused the law
of reason, divorcing it from theology and substituting jus naturak
for lexz naturalis.
In the common law, as well as in the civil law, the idea of
reason has formed the mainspring of many branches of our juris-
prudence. A great bulk of our law is expressed in terms of the
standard of reasonableness."' We have the test in cases of neg-
ligence of what the reasonably prudent man would do under the
same or similar circumstances. In probable cause for malicious
prosecution, the question is whether or not certain circumstances
were reasonably calculated to create the belief on the part of a
reasonable man that plaintiff was guilty. In contract, the reason-
able time within which the terms of the agreement must be ful-
filled or the purchase price paid, is often the issue to be deter-
mined. Reasonable force is a vital element in self defense. In
granting a new trial, the court must consider, not whether the jury,
as reasonable men, ought to have come to a different conclusion
upon the evidence, but whether the jury, as reasonable men, might
have arrived at this particular conclusion, although the two ques-
tions were not clearly differentiated at first.3 9 In construing writ-
ten instruments, it is for the court to make such inferences from
the written words as probably to represent the intention of the
parties. It seems that the Germans are more objective still in
their contract law. 0 In determining the "cooling time" necessary
in cases of malice, the time necessary for the ordinary reasonable
man to "cool," under the circumstances, must be the test. In
reviewing legislation and in passing upon the constitutionality of
state statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment, the problem is
to determine whether the restrictions placed upon individual con-
duct or the extent to which private property is taken is reason-
able, that is, whether there be a reasonable relation between the
means adopted, as represented in the statute, and a legitimate
object of legislative concern under the police power. Perhaps
the question is whether a reasonable legislature might find such a
37. "Commentaries" (Lewis' ed. 1899) Introduction, I, sec. 2.
38. Cf. Pound "Law and Morals" supra, 60.
39. Cf. Lord Halsburg in Metropolitan R. R. v. Wright 11 App. Cas.
152, 156, with Lord Blackburn in Capital Counties Bank v. Henty 7 App.
Cas. 774.
40. See German Civil Code sec. 145.
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relationship to exist, it is difficult to tell from the cases just how
objective the test is, but it is always one of reasonableness.
In every case there is a standard employed to determine the
operation of a legal principle. In every case of the employment
of such a standard, it is the moral judgment that is appealed to. 4'
Whether rates are unreasonable or not must be determined by a
direct appeal to the conscience of the court. What the courts do,
in these situations, is to determine what is "right," what is just
and equitable, and these are all matters of a primarily moral nature.
Now it is important to distinguish between the mere identifica-
tion of law and morals, and what may be termed a complete fusion
or amalgamation of the two, that is, the incorporation of the one
into the other, so that it becomes an integral part thereof. A
distinctly different process takes place when, because of the weight
and influence of moral considerations, the rule of law is changed
to accord with prevailing moral doctrine, from that which occurs
when the moral standards are introduced directly into and become
a part of the law. Legal rules, we have seen, may or may not
accord with morality, at any given time. The mores of today may
differ from those of yesterday, and at various periods in the law
lawyers have consciously striven to bring the legal and the moral
into accord.42 A rule of law at any one time may or may not be
"right," for as standards of morality, of reason and of justice
undergo change, the law, remaining more fixed and stable in its
rules, becomes increasingly discordant with ethics. But these
standards of moral and just and right thinking become increasingly
effective to change the rules of law, compelling the substitution
of other rules for the old ones. Now the law tends to become
more consonant with morality, or, as the Continental jurists put
it, the rules of law come more in accord with the principles of
"just law."'4 3 Technically, it may be inaccurate to insist that, be-
41. Cf. Salmond "Jurisprudence" (7th ed. 1924) 80, on questions of
"judicial discretion."
42. Pound "Theory of Judicial Decision" supra, 641.
43. "Ethical doctrine must, in accordance with its fundamental idea,
strive after a union with the method of just law. From the essence of ethics
we draw the legitimate conclusion that it must make the rules of law the sub-
ject matter of its realization. It can be shown that the compulsory character
of the law is the necessary condition of social uniformity generally, leading
as it does to right regulation of the social life of man. Now it is the busi-
ness of ethics to unite itself with the concrete consequences of the principles
of just law and to lend to the cold and dry commands of just law the warm
and fresh dream of a devoted will and an unchanging resolve to do the right.
Ethics must do this or deny her own command of unconditional striving for
the good. For ethical doctrine cannot find any other sphere for its realization
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cause the law in a given instance is identical with "just law," law
and morals are one. The sanctions for the ethical and for the
legal rule are still distinct. The legal rule is not law because it
is right, nor yet is the moral rule right because it is law. The
one is still purely legal and the other exclusively ethical, notwith-
standing the identity of content. Law and morals still have dif-
ferent objectives. 44  Nevertheless, in such cases, it seems equally
inaccurate to regard the content of the moral and the legal rule
as distinct and disconnected.
Moral standards brought albout alterations in rules of law,
by way of statutory enactment, in the law of defamation. The com-
mon law was explicit that proof of the truth constituted a complete
defense in actions for slander, upon considerations at one time
regarded as entirely adequate. No one was entitled to a better
reputation than his character justly entitled him. Consequently
he could not be heard to complain if nothing but the truth were
spoken of him. 45 But in time statutes were passed which changed
the rule and provided that the truth, in order to constitute a de-
fense in cases of defamation, must be accompanied by proof of
good motives and the existence of justifiable ends.4G  The ef-
fect of moral standards is obvious, but it is the significant thing
here. What the nores of the earlier community approved in law
in Puritanlike fashion, subsequent notions of right refused to
tolerate, and moral considerations influenced legislators to change
the rule of law to bring it in accord with changed rules of morality.
The influence of moral standards to produce a similar result
by way of judicial decision may be illustrated from the later
Roman law. The Law of the Twelve Tables demanded that in case
one died intestate leaving no direct heir, the inheritance should
pass through the male issue, thus giving the property to the grand-
children on the male side. In case there were none, the gentile, or
collateral heir of the male should take, thus cutting off any chil-
dren who might survive through the female stock. This was a rule
of law, just as our statutes of like nature are rules. The praetor,
perceiving that this was unfair, determined to give to alt who might
claim "by reason of blood kinship," although they had no valid
than that conduct which is based upon the rules of just law." Stamninler
"Theory of Justice" 70, 71. Cf. pp. 348, 349.
44. Ibid., 40.
45. See e. g., Castle v. Houston (1877) 19 Kan. 417.
46. See Harper "Ethical Bases of the Law of Defamation" (1926) 31
Dickinson Law Rev. 63.
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claim under the civil law. The Roman state, he conceived, de-
pended as much upon the female as upon the male stock for its
continued prosperity. Consequently it was unjust and impractical
for the male issue to enjoy such an advantage over the female stock.
The praetor, however, was bound by the law. To circumvent the
difficulty, he announced that he would treat the cognates of the
first order as though they were agnates-a pure legal fiction.4  This
was called aequitas, or natural justice. 48  Nevertheless, it was an
alteration of a fixed rule brought about by changed conditions
which produced altered conceptions of morality and of fair play.
The conscience of the praetor prevailed and while the moral stand-
ard did not become a part of the law, the rule of law yielded
to accord with the dictates of the moral judgment.
Now it is otherwise with respect to the legal standard. Here
it is the moral judgment, or the means of arriving thereat, that
itself becomes the law. There is not mere conformity between
law and morals which may or may not, at any given time, cease
to exist. This is an identity of matter and a corresponding identity
of content. But now the law has become, by fusion, one with morals
to the extent to which the moral standard has become a legal one.
Not only is there an identity of matter and of content,
but there is now an actual identity of form, for the method
of ordering is the same in its application to the same matter. The
content is now, not by chance in accord, but necessarily so. The
standard by which the moral judgment is reached is the exact one
by which the legal judgment is arrived at. The law has taken
over the ethical standard and clothed it with legal garb and what
is moral is now law. So long as the legal standard is now applied,
the result will be moral, and changed conditions, inateria, will find
corresponding alterations in ethical dogma in complete harmony
with law. The effect upon legal principles is, of course, a cor-
responding one so far as the content is concerned, for we have seen
that the principle depends upon the application of the legal stand-
ard.
It appears, then, that there is a great difference between
the effect produced in law by morality acting indirectly to influence
47. See Joseph H. Drake "Sociological Interpretation of Law" ('1918)
16 Mich. Law Rev. 599, 601. Professor Drake thinks that this is sociological
interpretation, although he has since admitted some doubt in the matter.
Whether it is sociological or spurious interpretation, the legal rule was
changed by force of moral standards, through the use of a legal fiction.
48. Gaius "Dig." 38, 8, 2. See Drake supra, 599, note 1.
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legal rules, and by acting directly by becoming amalgamated with
the law through legal standards. In the former case, the content
may or may not be identical between the legal rule and the moral
rule. In the latter case, the content must necessarily be identical.
In the first situation, the content is identical when the forms of
the two happen to coincide. In the second situation the content
is identical because the moral form itself has become the legal
form and, the matter being the same, the content cannot differ.
The result is that the moral content of the law is predominant
in those forms of law which we distinguish as the legal principle
and the legal standard.
